Corporate Governance

【TKI Voice】Activist Investors and Unsolicited Offer: Fundamentals and Practical Strategies (Part 2) — Revisions to the METI Guidelines for Corporate Takeovers, the “Just Say No” Defense, and Making Special Committees Function in Substance

This page provides an English executive summary of the Japanese article “【TKI Voice】アクティビストと「同意なき買収」対応の基礎と実務戦略(後編)——企業買収行動指針の見直し、Just Say Noディフェンスと特別委員会の実質化”. The full article is available in Japanese.

Executive Summary / Key Questions (FAQ)
  • Q1. How should a board of directors in Japan respond to an unsolicited (hostile) offer?
    A1. Under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's (METI) "Guidelines for Corporate Takeovers" (August 2023), when a company receives a "bona fide acquisition offer," the offer must be reported to the board of directors and given sincere consideration. A bona fide offer must not be ignored. To address conflicts of interest between management and shareholders, the basic practice is to establish a special committee composed of independent outside directors and statutory auditors, and to compare the offer with the corporate value of remaining independent (the stand-alone value) and with other strategic alternatives, from the perspective of enhancing corporate value and securing the common interests of shareholders.
  • Q2. In Japan, must a company accept an acquisition offer if the offer price is high?
    A2. No. METI's July 2026 review of the Guidelines (a clarification of their original intent) made clear that there can be exceptional cases in which even a high-priced acquisition offer does not enhance corporate value, and that even where multiple acquisition offers compete, there is no obligation to choose the highest bid (Japan has no equivalent of the U.S. "Revlon duties"). According to the Guidelines, a company may reject an offer if it can demonstrate specific, quantifiable dis-synergies (such as lost sales due to customer attrition) or uncertainty in obtaining clearances under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, the Antimonopoly Act, or other laws. In the United States, this strategy of rejecting acquisition offers is known as the "Just Say No" defense, and recent examples in Japan include Makino Milling Machine and TWINBIRD. To reject an offer on the premise of remaining independent, the company also needs a business plan and capital policy demonstrating a corporate value that exceeds the offer price.
  • Q3. What are the risks of using an MBO or take-private transaction as a takeover defense?
    A3. An MBO or take-private transaction is sometimes described as the "ultimate takeover defense" because it frees the company from capital market pressure. However, MBO premiums have risen to around 40% to 50% in recent years, and the burden of leveraged buyout (LBO) loans used to fund acquisitions has grown heavier. If directors take on excessive leverage without adequately assessing the financial impact, they may be found to have breached their duty of care. In the Unizo Holdings case, the company went private through an employee buyout (EBO) to counter a hostile tender offer, but then went bankrupt as borrowings of more than approximately JPY 200 billion strained its finances. In July 2026, the Tokyo District Court held the former president liable for damages of approximately JPY 3 billion (the case has reportedly been appealed).
  • Q4. Can Japanese companies still adopt takeover defense measures today?
    A4. Takeover defense measures adopted in ordinary times tend to face opposition from institutional investors and have become less common. Instead, "contingency-type" takeover defense measures, which are adopted once a specific acquirer has acquired close to 20% of the voting rights (or there is a risk of this), have become mainstream. Their purpose is to secure the information and time shareholders need to decide whether to accept the acquisition. To trigger such a measure through a gratis allotment of share options (so called poison pill), the company must get approval of its shareholders at a general meeting (see the Supreme Court decision in the Bull-Dog Sauce case). In 2026, Kusuri no Aoki Holdings proposed the adoption of a contingency-type defense measure at an extraordinary general meeting of shareholders, and it was approved with 55.5% of the votes in favor.
  • Q5. What role is a special committee expected to play in an MBO or a tender offer for a listed subsidiary by its parent company?
    A5. To protect minority shareholders from conflicts of interest between the acquirer and general shareholders, a special committee must function in substance, not merely exist in form. Specifically, this includes negotiating a price increase beyond the low end of the DCF valuation range, considering a majority-of-the-minority (MoM) condition and a market check, and preventing improper interference with valuation assumptions or the blocking of competing offers. In the FamilyMart case (tender offer price of JPY 2,300 versus a fair price of JPY 2,600) and the Shidax case (tender offer price of JPY 800 versus a fair price of JPY 950), the courts found the fair price to be higher than the tender offer price.
  • Q6. To what extent are deal protection provisions (such as no-shop and no-talk clauses) permitted in public M&A agreements?
    A6. Deal protection provisions that safeguard a friendly acquisition, such as fiduciary outs, matching rights, no-shop/no-talk clauses, and break-up fees, are permitted to the extent they are reasonable. A no-shop clause, under which the target agrees not to actively solicit third-party proposals, is generally considered acceptable. However, an overly restrictive no-talk clause that prohibits the target from even engaging in discussions in response to an unsolicited third-party approach, where no prior market check has been conducted, risks criticism from the market and investors and allegations of a breach of the directors' duty of care. METI's "Fair M&A Guidelines" (2019) likewise state that a deal protection provision completely prohibiting contact with competing bidders is an excessive restriction.
Read the Full Article (Japanese)

This English page is provided for informational purposes only. The Japanese version constitutes the authoritative text.

(Editorial supported by:Mikiharu Mori)


Mikiharu Mori
代表パートナー
Email:naoki.uemura@tkilaw.com