【TKI Voice】Activist Investors and Unsolicited Offer: Fundamentals and Practical Strategies (Part 1) — Latest Trends in Activist Engagement and “Deal Initiation”
This page provides an English executive summary of the Japanese article “【TKI Voice】アクティビストと「同意なき買収」対応の基礎と実務戦略(前編)——アクティビスト対応の最新動向と「ディール・イニシエーション」”. The full article is available in Japanese.
Executive Summary / Key Questions (FAQ)
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Q1. What is an activist investor, and what kinds of Japanese companies are most likely to be targeted?A1. An activist investor is an investor that acquires a stake of anywhere from a few percent to around 40% in a listed company and seeks investment returns by pressing management to raise the share price and corporate value through proposals and demands, such as increased shareholder returns, a review of the business portfolio, or governance improvements. Typical targets include companies with low capital efficiency, such as a price-to-book ratio (PBR) below 1x or a weak return on equity (ROE); cash-rich companies holding large amounts of cash, cross-shareholdings, or real estate; and companies with structural issues, such as continuing unprofitable businesses, parent-subsidiary dual listings, opaque governance by founding families or parent companies, or corporate scandals. Even companies in which founding families or stable shareholders hold large stakes can be targeted on grounds such as "private use of the company by the founding family" or "disregard for minority shareholders."
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Q2. What is the ultimate goal (exit strategy) of an activist investor?A2. The ultimate goal of an activist investor is to lock in investment returns through an exit. Shareholder proposals and public campaigns are merely means of gaining influence (leverage) over the company. There are four main exit routes: (1) selling shares on the market after corporate value (and the share price) has been increased; (2) having the company buy back the shares through a share repurchase (via ToSTNeT-3 or a self-tender offer); (3) selling the shares to a third party, such as a white knight; and (4) a management buyout (MBO) or take-private transaction. Routes (3) and (4) have become more common in recent years. MBOs and take-private transactions in particular typically carry a premium of around 40% to 50%, making them an attractive exit for activists.
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Q3. What is "deal initiation" by activist investors?A3. Deal initiation is a tactic in which an activist investor itself brings in potential acquirers, such as private equity funds, and starts a bidding process to steer the target company toward a take-private transaction or sale. A leading example is the approach taken by 3D Investment Partners at FUJI SOFT, which later developed into a bidding battle between KKR and Bain Capital. Because a company may be drawn into a take-private or sale process against its own intentions, it is important to address potential "weak spots," such as surplus cash, cross-shareholdings, and low-profit businesses, proactively and in ordinary times.
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Q4. What trends did activist investors and shareholder proposals show at Japan's 2026 annual general meetings?A4. At the 2026 annual general meetings, the number of companies receiving shareholder proposals exceeded 100, a record high, and the trend spread from small and mid-cap companies to large companies. On the other hand, the number of shareholder proposals approved fell from seven in 2025 to two. Even where shareholder proposals were rejected, however, there were a number of cases in which approval rates for the reappointment of top executives fell to the 50% to 60% range (e.g., KADOKAWA, KDDI, and OMRON). This reflects a growing tendency among institutional investors to vote against management based on formal criteria, such as ROE below 8%, PBR below 1x, cross-shareholdings exceeding 20% of net assets, or a female director ratio below 10%, as well as on grounds such as corporate scandals.
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Q5. What should a company be careful about when buying back an activist's shares through a share repurchase?A5. A share repurchase can be a way to have an activist exit, but because it involves an outflow of company funds, it may be criticized as a "huge payoff to leave." In addition, if it is regarded as providing a benefit in connection with the exercise of shareholder rights, it may violate the prohibition on providing benefits under the Companies Act, which carries criminal penalties (see the Supreme Court decision in the Janome Sewing Machine case). In particular, a repurchase through ToSTNeT-3 is an off-auction trade executed the morning after announcement, which makes it difficult for general shareholders to participate and has raised transparency concerns, so the method of implementation must be considered carefully. If a third party such as a white knight buys the shares instead, the outflow of company funds can be avoided, and issues relating to the provision of benefits are less likely to arise.
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Q6. What should Japanese companies do in ordinary times to prepare for activist investors?A6. There are four main steps: (1) regularly monitor changes in the shareholders through beneficial shareholder identification surveys; (2) proactively address its own vulnerabilities that could be used against the company, such as capital efficiency, the business portfolio, and cross-shareholdings; (3) maintain ongoing dialogue with institutional investors (IR/SR) and address their proxy voting guidelines (e.g., ROE below 8%, PBR below 1x, cross-shareholdings exceeding 20% of net assets, and a female director ratio below 10%); and (4) establish in advance initial response procedures for when the company receives a meeting request or shareholder proposal, as well as a defense team for contingencies, including lawyers, financial advisors, and proxy advisors. Because an activist's ultimate goal is to realize investment returns through an exit (e.g., a market sale, share repurchase, sale to a third party, or MBO/take-private), it is important to identify the goal the activist is aiming for and work backward from it in formulating a response.
This English page is provided for informational purposes only. The Japanese version constitutes the authoritative text.
(Editorial supported by:Mikiharu Mori)

代表パートナー
Email:mikiharu.mori@tkilaw.com